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Abstract: There is a broad call to integrate planetary boundaries and life-cycle
based reporting into accounting theory and reporting standards. Although
many practitioners back this call, including insurers, shareholders with a
long-term orientation, and company law specialists who suggest that the
inclusion of long-term stakeholder interests is necessary to counter both cor-
porate and systemic risks, it remains unanswered. We argue that dominant
assumptions about the status and architecture of corporations in corporate
governance theory stand at the centre of this unanswered call in accounting
theory and practice. As the status of the public corporation is interpreted as a
nexus of contracts and its architecture as a restricted dyadic relation between
‘principals’ and ‘agents’, the object and audience for corporate reports are
restricted to a very specific set of actors, interests and time-horizons. We
argue that this conceptual setup unduly restricts notions of accountability
and is connected to a specific notion of political economy. A broadening of
reporting standards needs, therefore, to be accompanied by a critical assess-
ment of the assumed object and audience of reporting in corporate governance
theory.
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1 Introduction
As the world faces shrinking supplies of resources and severe ecological dis-
ruption (WWF, 2016) it is becoming increasingly clear that ‘business as usual’
has not produced the institutions that will constrain economic activity to plan-
etary boundaries (Rockstro ̈m et al., 2009; Sjåfjell, 2018; Steffen et al., 2015;
Whiteman, Walker, & Perego, 2013). The systemic risks involved in going beyond
planetary boundaries are recognized by forward-looking business leaders.
Insurers have argued that the risks of climate change need to be met head
on1, while Larry Fink of the institutional investor Blackrock has argued that
the long-term stability of the business framework needs to be preserved and
needs to be supported by long-term investment perspectives (Sorkin, 2015).
Strine (2010, 2014)), chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has recently
expressed discontent with the short-term horizon of most investment portfolios,
and with the broader incapacity to consider long-term consequences of strategic
decisions in public corporations. This growing consideration of the long-term
possibilities and risks of corporate strategy by insurers, investors, boards and
company lawyers is supported by a public that increasingly expects businesses
to engage with the long-term effects of strategy, and notably sustainability risks
(Gleeson-White, 2014; Raworth, 2017; Sjåfjell, 2018).
Apart from an attention to risks, Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) as
well as Cheng, Lin, and Wong (2016) indicate that corporations that report about
their efforts in relation to environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) issues
perform better than other corporations on the stock market and enjoy lower cost
of capital. Monitoring and integrating information about systemic risks, long-
term corporate risks, and taking into account intangible resources and non-
financial capitals in life-cycle based reporting models could possibly provide a
comprehensive view on value, on the performance of the enterprise, and on
corporate risks beyond the short-term. Communicating this integrated view to
the corporation’s shareholders and other stakeholders helps builds legitimacy
and trust and provides a basis for economic success (Mayer, 2013). A broad set of
1 See https://www.zurichna.com/en/knowledge/articles/2016/08/climate-issues-are-top-global-
concerns, accessed 27-3-2017
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interests, including the self-interest of corporate stakeholders, thus aligns with
an approach to reporting that considers long-term value creation for all key
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, custom-
ers, communities, civil society organisations and the environment (Biondi, 2011;
Sjåfjell, 2018; Stout, 2012b; Veldman, Morrow, & Gregor, 2016).
There are frameworks available that allow such issues to be reported. The
International Integrated Reporting Council (“IIRC”) developed the Integrated
reporting (IR) Framework based on the Six Capitals model (Gleeson-White,
2014). A further expanded reporting guideline that considers relevant data in
terms of ESG impact is provided by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G4
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, which provides detailed metrics against
which to report. However, despite the many reasons to adopt a broad view on
corporate reporting, the object and audience for corporate reports are circum-
scribed by global principles for corporate reporting, including US GAAP and
IFRS, that focus narrowly on financial reporting as a mechanism to provide
information to absentee investors and creditors in order to support their deci-
sions (Bracci & Maran, 2013; Saravanamuthu, 2004). The practice of quarterly
financial reports, still required in the U.S. and by some European stock
exchanges, further limits the focus in terms of time-frames relevant for corporate
reporting (cf. Hellman, 2005).
In this article we take a closer look at the reasons behind and consequences
of this focus on absentee investors and short-term timeframes. Our basic argu-
ment is that the contemporary conceptual basis of accounting (hereafter
“accounting theory”) in terms of the notions of its object and audience relate
directly to a narrow view of the modern corporation adopted from contemporary
corporate governance theory. This view is manifest in terms of the conceptual-
ization of its status (i. e. the conception of the corporation as an integrated social
construct), architecture (i. e. salient components and the relations among these),
and purpose (i. e. the main objective(s) to be performed and interests to be
primarily satisfied). The adoption of narrow versions of these notions in account-
ing theory provides the background for a constrained operation of concepts like
information, transparency, accountability and materiality in accounting. It is in
relation to the adoption of this core set of assumptions about corporate status
and architecture in corporate governance, that the notion of the object and
audience of reporting becomes focused on absentee investors, that ESG infor-
mation is typically considered an add-on, rather than material, to financial
reports (Bracci & Maran, 2013; Saravanamuthu, 2004), and that its reporting is
left to voluntary and discretionary measures, which results in a lack of compa-
rability, lack of consistency and lack of certainty in benchmarking.
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The approach we suggest here views the issue of a limited uptake of
expanded reporting for the public corporation as a problem originating in
corporate governance, and more specifically as an issue with regard to the
object that is accounted for and the audience that is recognised as relevant in
relation to this construct. To the extent that specific notions of object and
audience that inform what is considered material become taken for granted
and largely inert, and thereby start to act as an obstacle for change (Scott,
2013) in accounting theory, the adoption of expanded reporting frameworks
will remain largely external and will have limited capacity to support a corpo-
ration’s ability to create sustainable value (Sjåfjell, 2018; Villiers & Mähönen,
2015a, 2015b; Whittington, 1993). To explore this argument, we start by examin-
ing the path-dependency of corporate governance theory and its links to
accounting theory (Biondi, Canziani, & Kirat, 2007; Müller, 2014; Zambon &
Zan, 2000).
2 Reporting for the public corporation
The way in which corporate activity is accounted for is tremendously important
for corporate managers, for investors, and other stakeholders. The dimensions
that are accounted for and, therefore, observed are central for key decision
makers that adjust their actions according to what is made relevant by such
accounts (Saravanamuthu, 2004; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). The policy choices
made by standard setters regarding such issues are based on the conceptual
foundation – explicit or implicit – of corporate reporting, providing a conceptual
model of the organisation it purports to represent and a notion of the purpose
and role of accounting reports in a larger system, which gives normative guid-
ance for accounting development (e. g. Zambon, 2013; Zambon & Zan, 2000).
It has been argued that the move of reporting standards such as IFRS and
US GAAP towards elements of fair value accounting was driven by a changing
conceptualisation of the corporation, which also transformed the conceptual
foundation of corporate reporting (Biondi, 2011; Botzem, 2014). While still con-
tested, we argue that the last four decades have been dominated by a view of the
nature of the public corporation as a nexus of contracts (NOC), and that this
view has helped shape accounting theory (Biondi et al., 2007; Müller, 2014;
Power, 2010). We shall here describe this model and in the next section discuss
how it relates to the absence of the broader view of corporate reporting that
preceded it.
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Three issues underpin the provision of corporate accounting reports. First,
accountants need an object to provide an account for. The conceptualization of
the status and architecture of the public corporation, by defining its essential
nature, salient components and their internal relations, determines the structure
of rights and relations between internal and external constituencies, and, hence,
how assets and liabilities are attributed and structured between those constitu-
encies (Veldman & Willmott, 2017a). Second, accountants need a specific audi-
ence to provide an account to. As different audiences may have different
frameworks for what is considered relevant information and relevant timescales,
the intended audience makes a difference for the choice of the type of informa-
tion that is relevant to report (Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996) and how this is
assumed to be used (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). Third, accountants need to know
what to account for in relation to broader frameworks. For instance, different
understandings of ‘trusteeship’ may inform different notions of ‘agents’ and
‘principals’ and of the interpretation of their relations (Millon, 2013a; Sjåfjell,
2018). With regard to all three issues, corporate governance theory has provided
shifting conceptualizations over the past two centuries, and most markedly in
the past four decades (Stout, 2012b; Veldman & Willmott, 2013).
With regard to the object for reporting, a broad view of the nature and
purpose of the public corporation that was central to company law and account-
ing started to be displaced about four decades ago, when the advent of
Principal-Agent theory (PAT) provided a redefinition of the status of the modern
corporation as a nexus of contracts (NoC) (Veldman & Willmott, 2016). Related to
this redefinition of the status of the public corporation, the status of the separate
legal entity was marginalized to that of a negligible ‘legal fiction’ (Fama, 1980:
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a result of this redefinition, the object that is
accounted for appears in accounting theory as a portfolio of cash-flow generat-
ing assets (Power, 2010), approached as discrete items that can be measured by
market-based valuation (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; Biondi, 2016; Biondi et al.,
2007; Davis, 2009).
With regard to the audience, PAT understands the role, function, and
position of the corporate board as an outcome of a direct and ongoing
contractual relation between shareholders and board members (cf. Fama,
1980). This setup has promoted a dyadic conception of corporate governance
in which executive managers and board members, typified as ‘agents’, are
limited2 to making decisions that serve shareholders, being their ‘principals’
2 A ‘market first’ conception of ‘accountability’ (Parkinson & Kelly, 1999: 104) means that even
if directors consider they may have a ‘responsibility’ to stakeholders, this task is fulfilled
through their ‘accountability’ to shareholders (Hampel, 1998: 12).
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(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). At the same time, executives are incentivized by
performance-related pay and share options and/or pressures from the market
for managerial talent, further reinforcing their exclusive attention toward the
market value of the public corporation (Fama, 1980). Both a theoretical setup
and practical incentives thus orient executives and board members toward
serving shareholders and, hence, the use of the modern public corporation to
produce market-based value (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; Blair, 1995; Bratton,
1989; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Johnson &
Millon, 2005; Millon, 2013a; Parkinson & Kelly, 1999). This orientation on
market-based value combines with a focus on specific interests and time-
frames. As Millon (2013a: 1019) argues:
Corporate management … confronts strong incentives to concentrate on quarterly results.
This can mean a willingness to forego expenditures that reduce earnings in the short-term
even though there may be potential long-term pay-offs. From the perspective of radical
shareholder primacy, management would violate its duty as agent of the shareholders if it
were to pursue some other objective that had the effect of reducing quarterly earnings,
such as the long-run sustainability of the corporation or some kind of social responsibility
agenda.
Related to these shifts in the conceptualisation of the object and audience for
accounting and in the focus on specific interests and time-frames we also find
shifts in the understanding of concepts like materiality, information, transpar-
ency, monitoring and regulation. With corporate governance theory conferring
the exclusive capacity to monitor corporate strategy to ‘principals’ in a dyadic
governance setup, these ‘principals’ and their imputed sentiments, calculations
and speculations come to function as the primary recipient, definer and eval-
uator of the scope and quality of the information presented by corporations,
thus determining whether a sufficient level of material information to achieve
appropriate transparency has been presented. In this framing, making a corpo-
ration transparent acquires the meaning of sharing data that is considered
especially relevant for solving the problems of these actors. As these ‘principals’
are conceived as ideal-typical ‘shareholders’, functioning exclusively as finan-
cial market actors with a distinct set of problems related to capital allocation
(Cremers & Sepe, 2016; Stout, 2012b), the data that is considered relevant is
typically related to the capacity to assess the value of corporate shares. This is
illustrated by the movement towards using fair-value measurement in financial
reporting in IFRS and US GAAP, which was legitimated by allegedly being
especially relevant for capital allocation decisions (Biondi, 2011; Power, 2010).
Changing conceptualisations of the object and audience in turn inform the
object for the monitoring and evaluation of corporate performance to become
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interpreted exclusively in terms of (short-term) market metrics (Lazonick &
O’Sullivan, 2000). And as the object of reporting becomes interpreted exclu-
sively in terms of focusing on ‘governance by disclosure’ and the provision of
‘high information flows’ (Ezzamel & Watson, 1997) toward ideal-typical market-
based actors functioning as evaluators of such information flows (Biondi, 2011),
the way in which such information is gathered may shift toward a reliance upon
self-regulation and ‘soft law’ (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; FRC, 2012) such as
accounting standards developed by allegedly agile private, international stand-
ard setters that can respond to the needs of these ideal-typical market actors. In
sum, as notions of status, architecture and purpose in PAT are adopted into
accounting theory, they affect the notion of the object and relevant audience
and, by consequence the meaning of concepts like ‘materiality’, ‘information’,
‘transparency’, ‘regulation’, and ‘monitoring’ in accounting theory and practice
(Eccles et al., 2014; Biondi; 2016; Saravanamuthu, 2004; Gray et al., 1996).
Finally, the uptake of PAT takes place in relation to the provision of a
broader framework that explains the necessity of these shifts in the object and
audience for reporting. As shown by many commentators, the notions of corpo-
rate status, architecture, and purpose provided by PAT differ markedly from a
previously accepted legal conception of the modern public corporation (Lan &
Heracleous, 2010; Millon, 2013a, 2013b; Robé, 2011; Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011;
Sjåfjell, 2018; Stout, 2012a; Veldman & Willmott, 2020; Weinstein, 2012). To
provide a rationale for these differences, a social utility argument was presented,
suggesting that the creation of market value in the interest of shareholders is the
best way to maximize social utility of the public corporation (Hansmann &
Kraakman, 2001). This functionalistic argument based on claims about social
utility made it possible to use PAT to redefine the status, architecture and
purpose of the modern corporation in broad institutions, including in account-
ing theory (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; Biondi, 2011; Ireland, 1999, 2005).
In fine, in the last four decades corporate governance theory has seen the
emergence of new assumptions with regard to status of the modern public
corporation based on a social, rather than a legal, norm (Sjåfjell, 2018) brought
forward by PAT. The acceptance of these assumptions in corporate governance
theory and institutions worldwide3 affected the notion of the object that is
accounted for and the audience that is accounted to and transformed the
3 That is not to say that these principles have been adopted uniformly or in equal measure in
all jurisdictions and in all contexts (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Larsson-Olaison, 2019). Rather, it
is to indicate that a de facto convergence on a limited number of conceptual points of departure
and their use for the building of national and transnational institutions, including accounting
standards, has broad ramifications (Veldman & Willmott, 2020).
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meaning and scope of concepts like ‘materiality’, ‘information’, ‘transparency’,
‘regulation’ and ‘monitoring’ in accounting theory and practice (Power, 2010;
Veldman & Willmott, 2016).
3 Corporate reporting and externalities
A theory of corporate governance based on PAT does not only focus reporting on
a specific object and audience, but also determines what is ‘relevant’ to report
about and what constitutes ‘externalities’ (Bracci & Maran, 2013; Hines, 1988;
Saravanamuthu, 2004). As PAT relates exclusively to a reduced object; to a
reduced dyadic conception of core constituencies; and to a reduced objective
of short-term market value increase, it effectively pushes all actors, interests and
time-frames outside of a privileged dyadic relation between ideal-typical ‘agents’
and ‘principals’ to the position of ‘externalities’. Hence, the adoption of PAT a
provides a framing that structurally omits the risks of managerial and investor
activity for other constituencies and interests, including social, environmental or
systemic risks that relate to the public corporation, employees and societies
(Friedman, 1970; Collison et al., 2016; Sjåfjell, 2018; Veldman et al., 2016). As a
consequence, what is considered the core of corporate reporting, is disclosure of
specifically the financial position and performance, calculated in a way to
support the decisions of arms-length investors, while issues such as perform-
ance in terms of environmental impact or employee well-being, is seen as
potential additions, external to the core. From this perspective, we argue that
the relevant point of departure to engage with reporting for a broader set of
actors, interests and time-frames is to highlight the inconsistencies and limita-
tions of a corporate governance regime based on PAT and, specifically, to show
its relevance for conceptualisations of the object and audience of corporate
reporting.
3.1 Object and audience
A central issue with PAT is that it ignores the conceptual consequences of the
development of the Separate Legal Entity (SLE) as a fully reified legal construct.
In essence, the SLE cannot be understood as a simple outcome of contract, or as
a simple asset over which a particular group can legitimately claim direct own-
ership or control. Instead, the SLE provides the basis for a specific view of
corporate architecture, in which the capacities and privileges bestowed on the
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corporation are directly related to a limitation of shareholder rights and claims
and on the direction of the duties of the corporate board toward the entity,
rather than (exclusively) to the shareholders.
As an ‘entity view’ directs the board’s duties, including its reporting duties,
toward the entity, and enables a discretionary space that allows the board to
include broader interests than just those of ideal-typical shareholders in corpo-
rate decision making, the entity view allows to interpret the object and the
audience of reporting differently from PAT (Biondi, 2011; Biondi et al., 2007;
Eisenberg, 1969; Lan & Heracleous, 2010; Nordberg & McNulty, 2013; Segrestin &
Hatchuel, 2011; Sjåfjell, 2018; Stout, 2012b; Stout et al., 2016; Veldman &
Willmott, 2017b).
By contrast, a view of boards and executives as directly accountable to
shareholders (see, e. g. Fama, 1980), and the prioritisation of both direct and
indirect ownership and control claims over the modern corporation for share-
holders, depicts the modern public corporation (and the SLE more specifically)
as an economic asset that is not completely dissociated from the shareholders.
In relation to an entity view, it becomes apparent that these views promoted by
PAT ignore the trade-offs in relation to the capacities and protections of the
corporation that shaped its legal history of ideas (Ireland, 2016). A theory of
corporate governance based on PAT thereby cherry-picks among the capacities
and protections provided by the modern corporation as a differential legal and
social construct and directs the positive aspects of these capacities and protec-
tions toward absentee shareholders and executive managers, while directing
costs and risks to all other stakeholders (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; Biondi,
2011; Stout, 2012a; Weinstein, 2012)
While, certainly, an entity view has its own problems that could be dis-
cussed at length – for example how to identify and prioritise among different
relevant stakeholders and time-frames – it does provide a model that offers the
conceptual means to start thinking about various important issues. These
include the legal foundations for corporate privileges; the role of the entity
and corporate architecture; the relevance of assigning duties to the board
regarding long-term sustainable value creation as well as engagement with
systemic costs and risks, and the monitoring and regulation of ESG risks in
relation to corporate strategy. In this sense, the entity view provides a valid
point of departure, both in corporate governance and in accounting theory, to
explore notions about the object and audience of the modern corporation in
relation to a much wider set of actors, interests and time-frames than those
relating to the hypothesised ‘ideal-typical’ shareholder with a myopic timeframe
that is central to PAT (Levillain et al., 2018; Sjåfjell, 2018; Stout, 2012b; Veldman,
2019b).
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3.2 Broader framing of PAT
An engagement with the broader framing of PAT provides clear reasons to
reconsider the limited framing it presents for corporate governance theory and
accounting. We showed how the intellectual basis for PAT is problematic as it
displaces legal assumptions about status and architecture based on claims of
increased social utility, and notably increased economic efficiency. Apart from
the limited legal support for the assumptions underpinning PAT (Bratton, 1989;
Ireland, 2018; Sjåfjell, 2018), it is notable that these social utility claims have
largely failed to materialize in practice. Although the adoption of PAT led to very
considerable increases in payouts to shareholders and managerial executives
(Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), this has reportedly materialized in the production
of increasing corporate and systemic risks, including a marked decline in invest-
ment in R&D; a deterioration of employment conditions; a growth in social
inequalities; and declining tax revenues for states (Collison et al., 2016; Davies,
Haldane, Nielsen, & Pezzini, 2014; Ireland, 2005; Kay, 2015; Veldman, 2019a).
Hence, rather than increasing overall social utility, the increased payouts to
absentee shareholders and executive managers were arguably made possible as
an effect of a strongly diminished regard for the consequences of corporate
strategy beyond the impact of the next quarter’s numbers and a resultant trans-
fer of costs and risks to other actors, harming their interests and ignoring their
preferences about time-frames. Arguably, then, the framing of corporate gover-
nance provided by PAT serves the interests of short-term market-value oriented
shareholders and corporate executives well, but fails to produce overall social
utility, as the medium and long-term costs and risks facing corporations and
societies as a consequence of the adoption of strategies that produce these
outcomes are structurally relegated to the status of ‘externalities’ and offloaded
onto all other actors, interests and time-frames (Collison et al., 2016; Davis,
2009; Deakin, 2012; Dore, 2008; Jacoby, 2008, 2011; Lazonick, 2013, 2014).
In sum, adoption of the PAT model in corporate governance provides new
assumptions of corporate status and architecture that strongly affect the object
and audience of corporate reporting. The theoretical framing based on PAT is
problematic in terms of its consistency with the historical legal foundations of
the modern corporation. And as theories of corporate governance based on PAT
cherry-pick among the capacities and protections provided by the modern
corporation and the conditions for the emergence of such capacities and pro-
tections (Stout, 2012b), they promote a selective and highly unequal distribution
of the potential benefits of the modern corporation. Specifically, the insertion of
a dyadic and contractual relation between ideal-typical conceptions of ‘agents’
and ‘principals’ establishes a core corporate governance relation between short-
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term market-value oriented shareholders and executive managers, and thereby
relegates all interests and risks outside this exclusive dyadic relation, according
those the status of ‘externalities’. As this problematic model for corporate
governance is built on questionable conceptual foundations and fails to provide
the social utility that underpinned its initial acceptance, we argue that the
dominant model for corporate governance that is based on PAT is in need of
revision. Relatedly, we argue that the effects of this model on the conceptuali-
sation of the object and audience of accounting needs to be revised in account-
ing theory and practice.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Although many actors in the corporate governance domain have expressed their
interest in broadening reporting practices, and although broader reporting mod-
els are available, attempts to push these models into reporting practice have had
debatable impact on our ability to advance reporting practices that could help
keep business activities within planetary boundaries (Alliance for Corporate
Transparency, 2019; Whiteman et al., 2013). To understand why this is the
case, and to understand how broader reporting practices can be implemented,
we have explored how the object, audience, and framing for corporate reporting
is related to a debate on the status, architecture and purpose of the modern
public corporation in corporate governance. At the heart of our exploration lies
the notion that the interpretation of the seemingly abstract notions of object and
audience have very concrete implications. Biondi (2011: 7) notes that “the quest
for accounting principles is not academic. Accounting principles … ultimately
affect the mode of generation of income to the business enterprise and its
allocation among the different stakeholders (including shareholders) through
time, space, and interaction”. We add that such accounting principles also affect
the allocation of costs and risks among different types of actors, interests and
time-frames.
We applied this notion to corporate reporting by exploring how the adoption
of PAT provides significant reformulations of the status, architecture, and pur-
pose of the modern public corporation in corporate governance theory and how
these notions become reflected and reinforced through reformulations of the
object and audience for corporate reporting in accounting. In relation to this
exploration, we submit that in order to expand the notion of information that is
considered relevant in reporting standards, we need to start from the perspective
that the most important driver of institutional change in reporting for public
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corporations is the conception of the status, architecture and purpose of the
modern public corporation in corporate governance theory (Biondi, 2011; Blair &
Stout, 1999; Parkinson, Gamble, & Kelly, 2000; Willmott & Veldman, 2016;
Zambon, 2013; Zambon & Zan, 2000; Zingales, 2000; Zumbansen & Williams,
2011).
This approach allows us to engage with corporate reporting in two different
ways. First, our exploration engages with accounting as an institutionalised
practice. We argue that the concepts that accountants relate to are not passive
reflections of reality, but are both formed by and formative of certain versions of
social reality (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991; Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1985; Miller
& Napier, 1993; Page & Spira, 1999). Viewing corporate reporting as an institu-
tionalised practice (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, & Nahapiet, 1980;
Hopwood, 1992; Miller, 1994), we find that the adoption of specific notions
about the modern public corporation in accounting theory provides legitimacy
and stability to these essentially normative4 ideas about the nature of the
modern public corporation (Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1985; Miller & Napier,
1993; Page & Spira, 1999; Tinker, 1991). Accounting’s appearance of neutrality
is likely to reinforce this (cf. Hines, 1988; Miller, 1994). Such normative ideas
play a reinforcing role through the continued adoption of notions of status,
architecture and purpose of the corporation, and, relatedly, of the relevant
audience and object for reporting from PAT. Because ESG issues are outside
the assumed interests of the stylized rendering of the core governance relation in
PAT between ideal-type shareholders and managers, this version of accounting
theory lowers the priority of these issues suggesting them to be less relevant to
include in accounting reports. In this regard, the observation that the framing of
the object and audience in corporate governance theory shapes central concepts
in accounting theory and that the development of corporate governance theory
is historically constituted, puts the onus of exploration on the role of accounting
theory and theorists.
Second, and relatedly, we engage with these issues from a practical point of
view. Our exploration shows that, as long as the NOC model is the de facto
conceptual foundation of corporate governance, attempts to broaden corporate
reporting are unlikely to succeed. At the same time, we argue that PAT
4 We note how the stabilization of PAT conceptions serves particular interests in terms of
political economy. Biondi (2011: 41) notes how the adoption of an NOC conception of the
corporation in accounting theory “ … adumbrates the firm as a financial trust devoted to the
cash enrichment of shareholders as its beneficiaries and trustees” and thereby serves to enrich
particular types of shareholders and executives, while externalizing the costs and risks of this
focus.
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structurally externalizes costs and risks linked to the use of a differential legal
construct to both corporations and societies. Hence, although institutionalized
practices with adjoining conceptual and normative foundations are inert and
slow to change (Scott, 2013), we argue that both for societal and for self-
interested reasons on the part of shareholders5 and managers, an overhaul of
corporate governance and accounting theory are long overdue. In this article, we
have indicated how an engagement with conceptual notions of status, architec-
ture and purpose in corporate governance and related notions about the object
and audience in accounting theory and practice provides a viable starting point
for the development and implementation of standards that include a broader set
of indicators and includes more audiences in accounting reports. Based on our
argument, such a conceptual approach to corporate governance and accounting
is more likely to change corporate reporting practices than an ever so sophisti-
cated elaboration of ESG measures within the framework of voluntary standards.
Considering the corporate and societal costs and risks involved in continuing
with the current framing, we find that a discussion on these issues is long
overdue.
References
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and soft law in international governance. International
Organization, 54(3), 421–456.
Aglietta, M., & Rebérioux, A. (2005). Corporate governance adrift: a critique of shareholder
value. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2010). Comparative and international corporate governance.
The Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 485–556.
Alliance for Corporate Transparency. 2019. The state of corporate sustainability disclosure




Biondi, Y. (2011). The pure logic of accounting: A critique of the fair value revolution.
Accounting, Economics, and Law, 1(1), Article 7.
Biondi, Y. (2016). The accounting representation of the enterprise entity: An historical per-
spective. In D. Bensadon, & N. Praquin (Ed.), IFRS in a global world (pp. 131–140). Cham:
Springer International Publishing.
5 Ironically, although PAT sets out to provide ‘shareholder primacy’, its limited framing of risks
and returns ultimately serves large sections of the shareholder constituency badly (Davies et al.,
2014; Stout, 2012b; Strine, 2010, 2014). As Sjåfjell (2018: 18) notes: “There is no form of social
collapse which is likely to produce good, stable and long-term returns for investors”.
Planetary boundaries and corporate reporting 13
Biondi, Y., Canziani, A., & Kirat, T. (2007). The firm as an entity: Implications for economics,
accounting and the law. Oxon: Routledge.
Blair, M., & Stout, L. (1999). A team production theory of economic law. Virginia Law Review,
85(2), 247–328.
Blair, M. M. (1995). Ownership and control: Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first
century. Washington: Brookings Inst Pr.
Botzem, S. (2014). The politics of accounting regulation: Organizing transnational standard
setting in financial reporting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bracci, E., & Maran, L. (2013). Environmental management and regulation: Pitfalls of environ-
mental accounting? Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal, 24(4),
538–554.
Bratton, W. W., Jr. (1989). Nexus of contracts corporation: A critical appraisal. Cornell Law
Review, 74, 407–465.
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The roles of accounting
in organizations and society. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(1), 5–27.
Carruthers, B. G., & Espeland, W. N. (1991). Accounting for rationality: Double-entry book-
keeping and the rhetoric of economic rationality. American Journal of Sociology, 97(1),
31–69.
Cheng, S., Lin, K., & Wong, W. (2016). Corporate social responsibility reporting and firm
performance: Evidence from China. Journal of Management & Governance, 20(3), 503–523.
Collison, D., Jansson, A., Larsson-Olaison, U., Power, D., Cooper, C., Gray, R., … Veldman, J.
(2016). The modern corporation statement on accounting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2863935
Cremers, K. J. M., & Sepe, S. M. (2016). The shareholder value of empowered boards. Stanford
Law Review, 68(67), 67.
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue
and data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371–382.
Daily, C. M., & Johnson, J. L. (1997). Sources of CEO power and firm financial performance: A
longitudinal assessment. Journal of Management, 23(2), 97–117.
Davies, R., Haldane, A., Nielsen, M., & Pezzini, S. (2014). Measuring the costs of short-termism.
Journal of Financial Stability, 12, 16–25.
Davis, G. F. (2009). Managed by the markets: How finance re-shaped America. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Deakin, S. (2012). The corporation as commons: Rethinking property rights, governance and
sustainability in the business enterprise. The. Queen’s LJ, 37(2), (September), 339–381).
Dore, R. (2008). Financialization of the global economy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(6),
1097–1112.
Eccles, R. G., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2014). The impact of corporate sustainability on
organizational processes and performance. Management Science, 60(11), 2835–2857.
Eisenberg, M. A. (1969). The legal roles of shareholders and management in modern corporate
decisionmaking. California Law Review, 57(1), 1–181.
Ezzamel, M., & Watson, R. (1997). Wearing two hats: The conflicting control and management
roles of non-executive directors. In K. Keasey, S. Thompson, & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate
governance: Economic, management and financial issues, (54–79). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy,
88(2), 288–307.
14 J. Veldman and A. Jansson
FRC. (2012). UK corporate governance code. London: Author.
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. New York
Times Magazine, 13, 32–33.
Gleeson-White, J. (2014). Six capitals: The revolution capitalism has to have - or can account-
ants save the planet? Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Gray, R., Owen, D. L., & Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and accountability: Social and environ-
mental accounting in a changing world. London: Prentice Hall.
Hampel, R. (1998). Committee on corporate governance: Final report. London: Gee Publishing.
Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R. (2001). The end of history for corporate law. Georgetown Law
Journal, 89(2), 439.
Hellman, N. (2005). Can we expect institutional investors to improve corporate governance?
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 21(3), 293–327.
Hines, R. D. (1988). Financial accounting: In communicating reality, we construct reality.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 13(3), 251–261.
Hopwood, A. G. (1985). The tale of a committee that never reported: Disagreements on
intertwining accounting with the social. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(3),
361–377.
Hopwood, A. G. (1992). Accounting calculation and the shifting sphere of the economic.
European Accounting Review, 1(1), 125–143.
Ireland, P. (1999). Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership. Modern Law Review,
62(1), 32–57.
Ireland, P. (2005). Shareholder primacy and the distribution of wealth. Modern Law Review, 68
(1), 49–81.
Ireland, P. (2018). Efficiency or power? The rise of the shareholder-oriented joint stock corpo-
ration. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 25(1), 291–330. Top of Form.
Ireland, P. (2016). The corporation and the new aristocracy of finance. In J.-P. Robé,
A. Lyon-Caen, & S. Vernac (Eds.), Multinationals and the constitutionalization of the world-
power system, (53–98). Dartmouth: Ashgate.
Jacoby, S. M. (2008). Finance and labor: Perspectives on risk, inequality and democracy.
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 30, 17–61.
Jacoby, S. M. (2011). Labor and finance in the United States. In C. A. Williams, & P. Zumbansen
(Eds.), The embedded firm: Corporate governance, labor, and finance capitalism
(pp. 277–317). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Johnson, L. P. Q., & Millon, D. (2005). Recalling why corporate officers are fiduciaries. William &
Mary Law Review, 46(5), 1597–1654.
Kay, J. (2015). Other people’s money: The real business of finance. New York: PublicAffairs.
Lan, L. L., & Heracleous, L. (2010). Rethinking agency theory: The view from law. Academy of
Management Review, 35(2), 294–314.
Larsson-Olaison, U. (2019). Convergence of corporate governance systems: A legal transplant
perspective. Article forthcoming in Competition & Change.
Lazonick, W. (2013). The financialization of the U.S. corporation: What has been lost, and how it
can be regained. Seattle University Law Review, 36(857), 857–909.
Lazonick, W. (2014). Profits without prosperity. Harvard Business Review, 92(9), 46–55.
Lazonick, W., & O’Sullivan, M. (2000). Maximizing shareholder value: A new ideology for
corporate governance. Economy and Society, 29(1), 13–35.
Planetary boundaries and corporate reporting 15
Levillain, K., Parker, S., Ridley-Duff, R., Segrestin, B., Veldman, J., & Wilmott, H. (2018).
Protecting long-term commitment: Legal and organizational means. In C. Driver, &
G. Thompson (Eds.), Corporate governance in contention (pp. 42–65). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Mayer, C. (2013). Firm commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in
it. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miller, P. (1994). Accounting as social and institutional practice: An introduction.
In A. G. Hopwood, & P. Miller (Eds.), Accounting as social and institutional practice, (1–39).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, P., & Napier, C. (1993). Genealogies of calculation. Accounting, Organization, and
Society, 18(7/8), 631–647.
Millon, D. (2013a). Radical shareholder primacy. University of St.Thomas Law Journal, 10(4),
1013–1044.
Millon, D. (2013b). Shareholder social responsibility. Seattle University Law Review, 36,
911–940.
Müller, J. (2014). An accounting revolution? The financialisation of standard setting. Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, 25(7), 539–557.
Nordberg, D., & McNulty, T. (2013). Creating better boards through codification: Possibilities
and limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992–2010. Business History, 55(3), 348–374.
Page, M., & Spira, L. (1999). The conceptual underwear of financial reporting. Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 12(4), 489–501.
Parkinson, J., & Kelly, G. (1999). The combined code on corporate governance. The Political
Quarterly, 70(1), 101–107.
Parkinson, J. E., Gamble, A., & Kelly, G. (2000). The political economy of the company. Oxford:
Hart Publishing.
Power, M. (2010). Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of reli-
ability. Accounting and Business Research, 40(3), 197–210.
Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut economics: Seven ways to think like a twenty-first-century econ-
omist. London: Random House.
Robé, J.-P. (2011). The legal structure of the firm. Accounting, Economics, and Law, 1(1), 1–86.
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin, F., Lambin, E., … Foley, J. Planetary
boundaries: Exploring the safe operating space for humanity. Ecology and Society, 14(2),
2009. Article 32.
Saravanamuthu, K. (2004). What is measured counts: Harmonized corporate reporting and
sustainable economic development. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 15(3), 295–302.
Scott, W. R. (2013). Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities. Thousand
Oaks: Sage Publications.
Segrestin, B., & Hatchuel, A. (2011). Beyond agency theory: A post-crisis view of corporate law.
British Journal of Management, 22(3), 484–499.
Sjåfjell, B. (2018). Redefining agency theory to internalize environmental product externalities.
In E. Maitre-Ekern, C. Dalhammar, & H. C. Bugge (Eds.), Preventing environmental damage
from products: An analysis of the policy and regulatory framework in europe (pp. 101–124).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sorkin, A. R. (2015). BlackRock’s chief, Laurence Fink, urges other C.E.O.s to stop being so nice
to investors. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/
business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurencefink-urges-other-ceos-to-stop-being-so-nice-
to-investors.html April 13, 2015
16 J. Veldman and A. Jansson
Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockström, J., Cornell, S. E., Fetzer, I., Bennett, E. M., ... Sörlin, S.
(2015). Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet. Science,
347(6223), 1259855.
Stout, L., Robé, J., Ireland, P., Deakin, S., Greenfield, K., Johnston, A., … Morrow P. (2016). The
modern corporation statement on company law (October 6, 2016). Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848833.
Stout, L. (2012a). The shareholder value myth. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Stout, L. (2012b). New thinking on “Shareholder Primacy”. Accounting, Economics, and Law,
2(2), Article 4.
Strine, L. E. J. (2010). One fundamental corporate governance question we face: Can corpora-
tions be managed for the long term unless their powerful electorates also act and think
long term? The Business Lawyer, 66(1), 1–27.
Strine, L. E. J. (2014). Making it easier for directors to do the right thing. Harvard Business Law
Review, 4, 235–253.
Tinker, T. (1991). The accountant as partisan. Accounting, Organization and Society, 16(3),
297–310.
Veldman, J. (2019a). Inequality, inc. Article forthcoming in critical perspectives on accounting.
Top of Form.
Veldman, J. (2019b). Boards and sustainable value creation: The legal entity, co-determination
and other means. European Business Law Review, 30(2), 279–300.
Veldman, J., Morrow, P., & Gregor, F. (2016). Corporate Governance for a Changing World: Final
Report of a Global Roundtable Series.
Veldman, J., & Willmott, H. (2013). What is the corporation and why does it matter?
M@n@ Gement, 16(5), 605–620.
Veldman, J., & Willmott, H. (2016). The cultural grammar of governance: The UK code of corporate
governance, reflexivity, and the limits of ‘soft’ regulation. Human Relations, 69(3), 581–603.
Veldman, J., & Willmott, H. (2017a). Social ontology and the modern corporation. Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 41(5), 1489–1504.
Veldman, J., & Willmott, H. (2017b). The corporation in management. In G. Baars, & A. Spicer
(Eds.), Critical corporation handbook, (197–212). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Veldman, J., & Willmott, H. (2020). Performativity and convergence in comparative corporate
Governance. (accepted). Competition & change.
Villiers, C., & Mähönen, J. (2015a). Accounting, auditing and reporting: Supporting or
obstructing the sustainable companies objective? In B. Sjåfjell, & B. J. Richardson (Eds.),
Company law and sustainability: Legal barriers and opportunities (pp. 175–225).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Villiers, C., & Mähönen, J. (2015b). Article 11: Integrated reporting or non-financial reporting?
B. Sjåfjell, & A. Wiesbrock (eds.), The greening of European business under EU law: Taking
article 11 TFEU seriously (118–143). London: Routledge.
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: A ten year perspective. The
Accounting Review, 65(1), 131–156.
Weinstein, O. (2012). Firm, property and governance: From berle and means to the agency
theory, and beyond. Accounting, Economics, and Law, 2(2), Article 2.
Whiteman, G., Walker, B., & Perego, P. (2013). Planetary boundaries: Ecological foundations for
corporate sustainability. Journal of Management Studies, 50(2), 307–336.
Whittington, G. (1993). Corporate governance and the regulation of financial reporting.
Accounting and Business Research, 23(sup1), 311–319.
Planetary boundaries and corporate reporting 17
Willmott, H., & Veldman, J. (2016). Reimagining the corporation: The relevance of legal,
economic and political imaginaries. In J. Haslam, & P. Sikka (Eds.), Pioneers of critical
accounting: A celebration of the life of Tony Lowe (pp. 231–257). London: Palgrave
Macmillan UK.
WWF. (2016). Living planet report 2016. Risk and resilience in a new era. Gland, Switzerland:
Author.
Zambon, S. (2013). Accounting and business economics: A conceptual revisitation. In Y. Biondi,
& S. Zambon (Eds.), Accounting and business economics - insights from national traditions
(pp. xi–xxii)). New York: Routledge.
Zambon, S., & Zan, L. (2000). Accounting relativism: The unstable relationship between income
measurement and theories of the firm. Accounting, Organization, and Society, 25,
799–822.
Zingales, L. (2000). In search of new foundations. Journal of Finance, 55(4), 1623–1653.
Zumbansen, P., & Williams, C. A. (2011). The embedded firm corporate governance, labor, and
finance capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18 J. Veldman and A. Jansson
